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L Facts
A. Texas Capital Sentencing Scheme Background
In Jurek v. Texas,' the United States Supreme Court upheld a Texas capital
sentencing scheme under which the death penalty followed automatically from
the sentencing jury's affirmative answer to each of two (and in some cases three)
special issues.2 Although the Court was then engaged in the process of form-
ulating a constitutional requirement that all relevant mitigating evidence be taken
into account before the death penalty could be imposed in any given case, it
nevertheless determined that the Texas scheme was constitutional.3 The court
found that one of the statutory special issues-whether the defendant would likely
pose a serious danger of future violent behavior if not executed-appeared broad
enough to encompass any relevant mitigating factor that a defendant might offer
as a reason against imposing the death penalty.4
Thirteen years after Jurek, however, the Court re-examined its conclusion.
In Peny v. Lynaugh ("Peny P'), the Court concluded that the "special issues" did
not provide an adquate vehicle for jury consideration of at least one specific kind
of mitigating evidence-namely, the defendant's mental retardation.6 Although
retardation clearly tends to reduce a defendant's moral culpability, the Court
observed that it also arguably increases, rather than decreases, his future danger-
ousness.7 For this reason, Pengy I held that Woodson v. North Carolina' and Lockett
v. Ohio9 required Texas sentencing juries explicitly to be allowed to give mitigating
effect to such evidence, apart from the issue of future dangerousness.' ° The
1. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
2. SeeJurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,276 (1976) (concluding that "Texas'[s] capital-sentencing
procedures... do not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments').
3. Id. at 274-75, 276.
4. Id.
5. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
6. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28 (1989) [hereinafter Peny I] (concluding that
"the jury must be allowed to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence relevant to a defen-
dant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense').
7. Id. at 323-24.
8. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
9. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
10. Peny I, 492 U.S. at 328. see Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (determining that
a death penalty scheme that precludes the consideration of mitigating factors is unconsitutional);
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Texas legislature eventually amended its sentencing statute to accommodate Peny
I by adding a final sentencing question that directly authorized the jury to decline
to impose the death penalty on the basis of mitigating factors.1 However, by the
time the Supreme Court handed down its decision, a slew of pre-Pengy I cases
were working their way through the Texas state and federal courts.
In reviewing these cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit narrowly interpreted Peny I and developed its own restrictive gloss on
what constituted constitutionally relevant mitigating evdience.12 However, in
Tennard v. Dretke,"3 the Court firmly rejected the Fifth Circuit's "constitutional
relevance" test. 4 Most recently in Smith v. Texas," the Supreme Court addressed
the Texas courts' use of the pre-Tennard approach to reveiwing Peny claims of
death-sentenced Texas inmates. 6
B. Facts of the Case
In 1991 a Texas jury convicted LaRoyce Lathair Smith of capital murder,
and he was sentenced in accordance with Texas's bifurcated capital sentencing
scheme. 7 During its closing argument, the prosecution reminded the jurors of
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (concluding that "in capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death").
11. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(e)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (allowing
Texas capital sentencing juries to impose a sentence of life imprisonment if sufficient mitigating
circumstances exist).
12. See Davis v. Scott, 51 F.3d 457, 460-61 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that to be relevant,
mitigating evidence "must show (1) a uniquely severe permanent handicap[ ] with which the
defendant was burdened through no fault of his own, and (2) that the criminal act was attributable
to this severe permanent condition" (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)); Madden v.
Collins, 18 F.3d 304,308 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "[t]o grant relief on a Peny claim, we must
determine (1) that the proffered evidence was constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence, and, if
so, (2) that the proffered evidence was beyond the effective reach of the juror" (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotations omitted)).
13. 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004).
14. See Termard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2571-72 (2004) (concluding that evidence is
relevant as mitigating evidence in capital cases if it "is of such a character that it might serve as a
basis for a sentence less than death" (internal quotations omitted)). For a complete discussion and
analysis of Tennard, see generally Mark J. Goldsmith, Case Note, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 115 (2004)
(analyzing Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004)).
15. 125 S. Ct. 400 (2004).
16. See Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400, 405 (2004) (discussing the Texas Criminal Court of
Appeals's inappropriate reliance on Tennara).
17. Id. at 401-02. After closing time, Smith and a number of friends arrived at the Dallas
County Taco Bell where he had previously been employed. Id. at 401. Smith convinced the two
employees that were shutting down the restaurant to open the door so that Smith could use the
telephone. Id. Once the two employees let the petitioner in, Smith commanded the employees to
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their voir dire assurances that they were capable of applying the death penalty
when appropriate by answering "yes" to each of the two special issues of deliber-
ateness and future dangerousness." The judge then instructed the jury. 9 His
oral instructions included, as Peny I required, a statement that the jury could
consider mitigating circumstances. 20 However, the jury was furnished with a
statutory jury verdict form that made no mention of mitigation evidence and
tracked the prosecution's reminders delivered during its closing argument.2 ' The
form simply required "yes" or "no" answers to the two special issues of deliber-
ateness and future dangerousness.2 The jury answered each in the affirmative,
and Smith was therefore sentenced to death.23
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the verdict and sentence on
direct appeal, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1995.24 The trial court
then dismissed Smith's petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely, but an
amendment to the Texas criminal code allowed Smith to refile. 25 Smith claimed
that evidence of his low I.Q. and attendance of special education classes required
consideration as mitigation outside the special issues. 26 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, however, denied his claim. 7
II. Holding
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.2 8 The
Court determined that Smith's mitigating evidence was relevant, requiring "the
trial court to empower the jury with a vehicle capable of giving effect to that
evidence."29 Because the trial judge's supplemental instruction failed to provide
the jury with such a vehicle, the Supreme Court determined that it violated the
Eighth Amendment.30
leave the building because he intended to rob the restaurant. Id. When both refused to leave, Smith
struck and shot one of the employees. Id. Although he threatened the victim's co-worker, Smith
left with his friends without harming the second employee. Id.
18. Id. at 403; see TEX. CRIm. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (requiring
the submission to the jury of the two special issues of deliberateness and future dangerousness).
19. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 403.
20. Id. at 402.
21. Id. at 403.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 404; see Smith v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1112, 1112 (1995) (denying certiorari).
25. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 404.
26. Id. at 404-05.
27. Id. at 404.
28. Id. at 401.
29. Id. at 405.




A. Proper Standard of Evidence
The Court first noted that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals announced
its decision prior to Tennard.3" Using a "constitutionally-relevant" screening test
identical to the one rejected in Tennard, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
determined that evidence of Smith's low I.Q. and history of having attended
special education classes was irrelevant.32 Quoting Tennard, the Supreme Court
stated that " '[elvidence of significantly impaired intellectual functioning is
obviously evidence that might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.' "33
The Court also cited Wiggins v. Smith' to illustrate that an I.Q. higher than
Smith's had been considered relevant mitigating evidence.
35
Contrary to Tennard's subsequent holding, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals also required a nexus between Smith's diminished mental capacity and
the commission of the murder.36 The Tennard Court had rejected the Fifth
Circuit's nexus requirement because no existing precedent required a defendant
to establish a relationship between mental capacity and capital murder" 'before
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on execut[ion] ... is triggered."' 37 The Smith
Court concluded that "[b]ecause petitioner's proffered evidence was relevant, the
Eighth Amendment required the trial court to empower the jury with a vehicle
capable of giving effect to that evidence."3"
B. SupplementalJugy Instruction
In Peny v. Johnson ("Peny 1"),39 the trial judge provided a supplemental
instruction that informed the capital sentencing jury that it could consider
mitigating evidence in addition to deliberateness and future dangerousness. 4 The
verdict form, however, listed the special issues without mention of mitigating
evidence.4 The Supreme Court held that although the supplemental instruction
31. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 404; see Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2570-71, 2573 (rejecting the "constitu-
tional relevance" test used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and holding
that the jury must be given an effective vehicle for which to weigh relevant mitigating evidence).
32. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 405.
33. Id. (quoting Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2572).
34. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
35. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 405; see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,523,535-38 (2003) (determin-
ing an I.Q. of 79 to be relevant mitigating evidence).
36. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 405.
37. Id. (quoting Tennard, 124 S. Ct. at 2571-72).
38. Id.
39. 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
40. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 789-90 (2001) [hereinafter Pent7 II].
41. Id. at 790.
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informed the jury that it could consider mitigating evidence, it did not satisfy the
Eighth Amendment because of its failure to provide an adequate vehicle for the
jury to give effect to such evidence.42 Specifically, the instructions permitting the
jury to consider mitigating evidence contradicted the verdict form, which only
provided for the consideration of the special issues.43 Thus, the Supreme Court
determined the supplemental instruction to be "an inadequate vehicle for the jury
to make a reasoned moral response to Penry's mitigating evidence.""
The Supreme Court next evaluated the trial court's supplemental jury
instruction to determine whether it adequately permitted the jury to give effect
to the mitigating evidence.4" Because the trial court told the jury both to consider
all the mitigating evidence and also how to give effect to that mitigating evidence
in relation to the special issues, the state appellate court determined that the
supplemental instruction provided the jury with adequate means to give effect to
the evidence.46 Although the Texas court also noted specific distinctions be-
tween the faulty Peny 11 instruction and that given by the trial court in this case,
the Supreme Court determined "those distinctions ... constitutionally insignifi-
cant."47
The Court noted that the common error in Smith and Tennard was the
creation of an ethical dilemma for the respective juries." Specifically, the
"'mitigating evidence did not fit within the scope of the special issues,' "render-
ing the juries unable to comply simultaneously with both the jury instructions and
the jury verdict forms.49 To answer the special issues as required by the verdict
form necessitated ignoring the instruction to consider mitigation; to answer the
special issues as required by the instructions necessitated ignoring the verdict
forms' strict focus on the two special issues.5" Consideration of mitigating
evidence was in no way included on the verdict form and the special issues "had
little, if anything, to do with the mitigation evidence petitioner presented. 5 1 The
Supreme Court concluded by noting that even had the jury adequately under-
stood the trial court's instructions, it" 'was essentially instructed to return a false
42. Id. at 800.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 405.
46. Id. at 405-06.
47. Id. at 406.
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Peny II, 532 U.S. at 799).
50. Id.
51. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 407.
2005]
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answer to a special issue in order to avoid a death sentence.' ,,62 The nullification
instruction was therefore constitutionally inadequate.5 3
IV. Application in Viginia
A. Proper Standard of Eidence
Smith reiterates much of the Tennard decision, and the case further solidifies
the Supreme Court's invalidation of any heightened requirement of relevance for
mitigating evidence. This position, however, does not directly alter Virginia
capital procedure because the relevant state statute provides in part that "evi-
dence may be presented as to any matter which the court deems relevant to
sentence."' Smith serves as a reminder that state courts must find mitigating
evidence relevant if it" 'tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circum-
stance that a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value.' "5
Accordingly, defense counsel should continue to object to the exclusion of any
mitigating evidence meeting this liberal threshold of relevance.
B. Supplemental jugy Instruction
In Smith, the Supreme Court determined that the jury must be given "a
vehicle capable of giving effect to" the mitigating evidence proffered by the
defense. 6 Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(D) provides the two alternative jury
verdict forms for a capital sentencing proceeding, and these statutory forms are
coupled with a jury instruction from the bench. 7 However, Virginia does not
have statutory jury instructions. Suggested instructions are supplied by Virginia
Practice Series Jury Instructions."8 Although the instructions provide jurors with
52. Id. (quoting Peny 1I, 532 U.S. at 801).
53. Id.
54. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2004).
55. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 404 (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 440 (1990)).
56. Id. at 406.
57. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(D) (providing one form for a sentence of death and
another form with the options of "imprisonment for fife" or "imprisonment for fife and a fine of
$ _ '_ .
58. See VA. PRAc.J.I.S. § 122:04 (2005) (providing jury instructions that contain the appropri-
ate vehicle for giving effect to mitigating evidence). The instructions also include an illustrative fist
of mitigating factors for the jury's consideration:
When determining the punishment to be imposed for a commission of capital murder,
you shall consider the circumstances surrounding the offense, the history and back-
ground of the defendant, and any other facts in mitigation of the offense. Facts in
nitigation, if proven by the evidence, may include, but shall not be limited to the
following- (i) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; or (ii)
the capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance, or (iii) at the time of the commission of the
capital felony, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired; or (iv)
[Vol. 17:2
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the necessary vehicle for giving effect to mitigating evidence, the lack of lucidity
may easily confuse the lay juror.59 Contrary to the Virginia Model Jury Instruc-
tions, such sources as Leonard Sand et al., Modern FederalJuy Instructions, provide
comprehensive yet clearly stated explanations of mitigating evidence and its role
in capital sentencing.60 Although the Modern FederalJuy Instructions provisions for
mitigating factors conform to the Federal Death Penalty Act (18 U.S.C. § 3591
et. seq.), the instruction can easily be adjusted to accommodate Virginia law.
Furthermore Virginia Code section 19.2-263.2 states that "[a] proposed jury
instruction submitted by a party, which constitutes an accurate statement of the
law applicable to the case, shall not be withheld from the jury solely for its
nonconformance with model jury instructions."'6 Because both model instruc-
tions comply with section 19.2-263.2, defense counsel should always proffer such
an instruction in a case involving the presentation of mitigating evidence at the
sentencing proceeding.62
V. Conclusion
Smith serves as a reminder that mitigation evidence need only meet a bare
minimum standard for relevance, and the Supreme Court will not hesitate to
strike down any additional requirements.63 Moreover, the Court reiterated that
impaired intellectual functioning may serve as mitigation evidence in a capital
sentencing proceeding.'M Lastly, because the Virginia Code allows a defendant
to suggest a jury instruction that accurately states the law, defense counsel should
take advantage of model instructions such as those referenced in this case note.
Mark J. Goldsmith
the age of the defendant at the time of the commission of the capital offense; or (v)
mental retardation of the defendant.
Id.
59. Id.
60. See LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERALJURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 9A-18 (2002)
(providing jury instructions for the appropriate consideration of mitigating evidence).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-263.2 (Michie 2004); see Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C. §
3591-3598 (2000) (stating the procedure for the institution of the death penalty in a federal capital
case).
62. For a discussion of the consequences of proffering jury instructions, see Melissa A. Ray,
'Meaningful Guidance": Reforming Vipnia's ModelJut7 Instructions on Vileness and Future Dangerousness,
13 CAP. DEF. J. 85, 100-01 (2000) (analyzing the consequences to defendants of proposing jury
instructions).
63. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 404.
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